Active Investing in Japan

Reuters (article in Japanese) reports that Goldman Sachs issued a report earlier this week that argues M&A will be the major theme for Japanese equities in 2010. Having a ‘macro’ investment theme for the start of each new year is a ritual for brokerages in Japan, although it seems no one ever has the resolve to action or follow through; and the M&A theme itself is not a new one. So Goldman repeats known information that Japan (equities) was overly victimized in the financial crisis and remains largely defenseless to external shocks. With ROE so low, domestic demand remaining sluggish, and overseas competition ever-intensifying, the best bet for Japanese companies is to merge and restructure. M&A/restructuring should boost top-line growth, says Goldman, which also should help margins, and therefore drive stock prices higher.

However, the longstanding problem with inward M&A is that reorganization is easier said than done (as heads, and tails in the form of non-core subsidiaries, tend not to roll in Japan), the volume of M&A has often disappointed, and the size of deals has been on the small side.  Nevertheless, all of that means there is still great opportunity in Japan. The best opportunities appear to continue to be in smaller-sized deals, where there are plenty of gems, and in listed subsidiaries. Goldman is said to favor retail, machinery, services, land transport, non-bank financials, warehousing, and real estate — the underlying idea is that these industries are the most fragmented.

Bottoms-up then, as 2009 is winding down and 2010 is poised to be the year of M&A (at least thematically or in a macro sense).

No doubt David Einhorn (Greenlight Capital) is an astute investor. Recently he declared his bearish view on JGBs, which subsequently has generated heavy interest among financial and political circles. Hats off to Gwen Robinson of FT Alphaville for solid ongoing coverage of the latest JGB tale (see JGBs and the ‘end’ of the short-squeeze fest). My take is as follows:

Regardless of whether Einhorn still has his short trade on or not, the chips are stacked against him and any copycats. It’s a fat chance for opportunistic hedge funds, since JGBs, even with their paltry yields (and circumstantial concerns), have both sizable and perpetual domestic demand. As I said in my last post on this topic, in spite of subdued individual investor demand, there is always an obliged patron of JGBs (the domestic institutional investor), which in the collective can fend off any offensive.

On the surface, Japanese investors sure seem confounded, largely (and in the author’s opinion, mistakenly) shunning their own depressed equities, while settling for skeletal JGBs and feeling compelled to chase overseas trends.  I used to think they were unpatriotic, in a sense, for not being buyers of domestic stocks. However, it turns out they are exceedingly patriotic given that even if they’ve lost their appetite for JGBs (in the case of individual investors), they’ll be silent holders one way or another via proxy, thanks to institutional money managers.

The Einhorn-JGB story is a reminder to Japan bears that no matter how shaky the shoji rice paper sliding doors and tatami floors appear, the pillars are quite strong and have reinforcements. As I discovered last October (‘08) when the Nikkei tumbled to 1982-levels, the seemingly disastrous cross-shareholding system in Japan actually turned out to be one solid floor for equities. With the addition of timely pension fund-buying, the two effectively stopped the hemorrhaging.

So it is, Japan remains an enigma to outsiders. JGB shorts with a prerequisite nine lives. And value investors stuck in, or already having pried themselves out of, the most elusive value trap.

The Mainichi Shimbun (original in Japanese) reported early Thursday that Japanese Government Bonds’ (JGBs) popularity is rapidly falling among individual investors. Beginning in 2003, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) has sold two types of JGBs (a fixed-rate 5-year and a variable-rate 10-year) four times a year to individual investors. However, as interest rates have been held at zero (remember ZIRP) to near-zero levels for years, Japanese individual investors may finally be voting with their purses. The October 5-year issue had a coupon of 0.6%, the lowest since the program began in ‘03, and less than half the peak coupon rate of 1.5% in July ‘07.

The MoF now only expects to raise Y1.3 trillion (US$14.3B) this year from individual investors, down from a prior estimate of Y2.4 trillion, and considerably lower than the record Y7.2 trillion raised in ‘05. Through the end of this September, individual investors held Y27.7 trillion or 4.6% of JGBs outstanding. The MoF argues that recent individual investor reluctance for JGBs is not an issue because their weighting is so low. However, it goes without saying, as the article accurately points out, that it is an issue, as the government is poised to take on even more debt in the face of declining tax revenues.

In fact, the MoF is reportedly planning to introduce a fixed three-year JGB for individual investors next July. At this time, it’s hard to imagine a warm welcome, let alone a return to previous years’ embracing of JGBs. The MoF may be right in not being very worried, since it can just pressure domestic institutional investors to pick up the slack. So whether individual investors like it or not, it’s probably the case that they will remain proxy buyers of JGBs.

Japan watchers and investors will readily recognize and perhaps even sympathize with the plight of domestic savers. The golden days of the yen carry trade seem so distant with US$1/Y90-level support so sticky. It’s a real shame that Japanese companies don’t pay quarterly dividends as is common practice in the U.S., for instance, since household, quality Japanese companies are in some cases paying dividends at multiples of what JGBs offer. The desperate search for yield could be called off. Instead of chasing the latest overseas investment fad or making risky leveraged forex trades, maybe something more productive could be achieved.

Disclosure: The author has no direct exposure to JGBs, and does not believe a crisis is looming for Japan despite David Einhorn’s position, and in spite of the serious problems the country faces but continues to bundle into a bumbling status-quo.