Active Investing in Japan

Internet Initiative Japan (IIJI) (3774) is a Japanese internet service provider offering a full suite of connectivity and outsourcing services. It is a pioneer among Japanese internet-related companies, having originally listed its shares on the Nasdaq in 1999, before eventually listing in Tokyo (Mothers) in 2005 and later transitioning to Topix 1st Section.

At the end of February, I submitted a letter to the company’s chairman (Mr. Suzuki) and its other directors. While applauding them for their prior decision to repurchase shares, the timing of which coincided with the bottoming of IIJ’s stock, and also for maintaining the dividend, I voiced some concerns and submitted proposals that are either to be actioned or designated for resolution at the Annual Shareholders’ Meeting this June. IIJ’s Investor Relations Officer has been helpful and cordial, and has already forwarded my letter and proposals. Below, I will briefly outline my position.

Unfortunately, despite having listed in the U.S., making it to Topix-1, and having a reasonable level of awareness within commerce and government in Japan, IIJ remains a largely unknown company in the investment community. Since I’ve been a shareholder for a while now I am not pleased about this, but it in fact represents an opportunity.

A cursory review of IIJ’s financials will show that the company met some hard times in 2008 (fiscal year-end March ‘09), as did most companies, but it remained profitable. However, given the weak economy in Japan and lingering deflation, 2009 (FYE 3/2010) is not looking as if it will be significantly better than 2008; that is, as revenues are forecast to be lower, although earnings are expected to rise about 20%, but still be only about a third of what they were between fiscal years 2006-2008. Meantime, IIJ is moving right along with capex, granted some of it is regarded as critical given the upgrade cycle of networking equipment. I have asked IIJ to review its capex/depreciation, while considering the models of Google and Amazon for cloud computing, an area, along with mobile connectivity, that represents great opportunity for the company.

One of my chief concerns relates to the level of capex and correspondingly, the heavy depreciation. Furthermore, the growth in assets, while it had led to top-line growth, it hasn’t brought an increase this year, and has not generated growth on the bottom-line for the past two years. To make matters worse, IIJ is sitting on a sizable pile of cash, nearly ¥8.5 billion ($94M) as of the most recent quarter’s end, compared to total assets of around ¥47 billion, and a market capitalization of around ¥40 billion (keep in mind that its shares are up about 25% in the past month). The company doesn’t have long-term debt, but it does utilize capital leases, which represent a “long-term” liability of ¥3.9 billion. IIJ has no working capital concerns whatsoever, and has access to very cheap bank lending facilities at a cost of capital under 2%.

My specific proposals involve:

I. A stock-split of the ordinary shares of at least 10:1, but preferably 100:1. Correspondingly, in light of the 400:1 ADR-to-Ordinary ratio and IIJ’s subsequent five-dollar per share ADSs, again I suggest a 100:1 ordinary split and a 1:4 ADR split. While stock splits don’t impact the fundamentals, they would most certainly help improve IIJ’s trading liquidity and improve its potential investor base.

II. Switch to a quarterly dividend payout schedule instead of biannually. I suggest this given it is common practice in the U.S. and the appreciation most shareholders will have for a more frequent payout.

II. Announce another stock buyback. I have already summarized IIJ’s cash position above. I regard IIJ as undervalued both based on a valuation of its assets and a return to at least the levels of profitability it achieved in the recent past. Use of cash for share repurchases is ideal considering IIJ’s recent low ROA (and ROE) and its foray into a non-core business (see below).

III. Allow shareholders to vote on any investment or acquisition in excess of ¥1 billion that does not involve IIJ’s core business related to internet connectivity and services. This proposal is prompted by its new ATM business. It has a majority stake in a business that places ATM’s in pachinko parlors (similar to how ATMs are placed in casinos). While this business may someday become profitable (I have asked for revenues/earnings guidance), it has accumulated losses to-date of over ¥1 billion, and it will need even more capital before all the thousands of ATMs are deployed.

One-year stock chart of IIJI:

Disclosure: The author owns shares of IIJ. Note this article does not constitute investment advice.

Reuters (article in Japanese) reports that Goldman Sachs issued a report earlier this week that argues M&A will be the major theme for Japanese equities in 2010. Having a ‘macro’ investment theme for the start of each new year is a ritual for brokerages in Japan, although it seems no one ever has the resolve to action or follow through; and the M&A theme itself is not a new one. So Goldman repeats known information that Japan (equities) was overly victimized in the financial crisis and remains largely defenseless to external shocks. With ROE so low, domestic demand remaining sluggish, and overseas competition ever-intensifying, the best bet for Japanese companies is to merge and restructure. M&A/restructuring should boost top-line growth, says Goldman, which also should help margins, and therefore drive stock prices higher.

However, the longstanding problem with inward M&A is that reorganization is easier said than done (as heads, and tails in the form of non-core subsidiaries, tend not to roll in Japan), the volume of M&A has often disappointed, and the size of deals has been on the small side.  Nevertheless, all of that means there is still great opportunity in Japan. The best opportunities appear to continue to be in smaller-sized deals, where there are plenty of gems, and in listed subsidiaries. Goldman is said to favor retail, machinery, services, land transport, non-bank financials, warehousing, and real estate — the underlying idea is that these industries are the most fragmented.

Bottoms-up then, as 2009 is winding down and 2010 is poised to be the year of M&A (at least thematically or in a macro sense).

No doubt David Einhorn (Greenlight Capital) is an astute investor. Recently he declared his bearish view on JGBs, which subsequently has generated heavy interest among financial and political circles. Hats off to Gwen Robinson of FT Alphaville for solid ongoing coverage of the latest JGB tale (see JGBs and the ‘end’ of the short-squeeze fest). My take is as follows:

Regardless of whether Einhorn still has his short trade on or not, the chips are stacked against him and any copycats. It’s a fat chance for opportunistic hedge funds, since JGBs, even with their paltry yields (and circumstantial concerns), have both sizable and perpetual domestic demand. As I said in my last post on this topic, in spite of subdued individual investor demand, there is always an obliged patron of JGBs (the domestic institutional investor), which in the collective can fend off any offensive.

On the surface, Japanese investors sure seem confounded, largely (and in the author’s opinion, mistakenly) shunning their own depressed equities, while settling for skeletal JGBs and feeling compelled to chase overseas trends.  I used to think they were unpatriotic, in a sense, for not being buyers of domestic stocks. However, it turns out they are exceedingly patriotic given that even if they’ve lost their appetite for JGBs (in the case of individual investors), they’ll be silent holders one way or another via proxy, thanks to institutional money managers.

The Einhorn-JGB story is a reminder to Japan bears that no matter how shaky the shoji rice paper sliding doors and tatami floors appear, the pillars are quite strong and have reinforcements. As I discovered last October (‘08) when the Nikkei tumbled to 1982-levels, the seemingly disastrous cross-shareholding system in Japan actually turned out to be one solid floor for equities. With the addition of timely pension fund-buying, the two effectively stopped the hemorrhaging.

So it is, Japan remains an enigma to outsiders. JGB shorts with a prerequisite nine lives. And value investors stuck in, or already having pried themselves out of, the most elusive value trap.

The Mainichi Shimbun (original in Japanese) reported early Thursday that Japanese Government Bonds’ (JGBs) popularity is rapidly falling among individual investors. Beginning in 2003, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) has sold two types of JGBs (a fixed-rate 5-year and a variable-rate 10-year) four times a year to individual investors. However, as interest rates have been held at zero (remember ZIRP) to near-zero levels for years, Japanese individual investors may finally be voting with their purses. The October 5-year issue had a coupon of 0.6%, the lowest since the program began in ‘03, and less than half the peak coupon rate of 1.5% in July ‘07.

The MoF now only expects to raise Y1.3 trillion (US$14.3B) this year from individual investors, down from a prior estimate of Y2.4 trillion, and considerably lower than the record Y7.2 trillion raised in ‘05. Through the end of this September, individual investors held Y27.7 trillion or 4.6% of JGBs outstanding. The MoF argues that recent individual investor reluctance for JGBs is not an issue because their weighting is so low. However, it goes without saying, as the article accurately points out, that it is an issue, as the government is poised to take on even more debt in the face of declining tax revenues.

In fact, the MoF is reportedly planning to introduce a fixed three-year JGB for individual investors next July. At this time, it’s hard to imagine a warm welcome, let alone a return to previous years’ embracing of JGBs. The MoF may be right in not being very worried, since it can just pressure domestic institutional investors to pick up the slack. So whether individual investors like it or not, it’s probably the case that they will remain proxy buyers of JGBs.

Japan watchers and investors will readily recognize and perhaps even sympathize with the plight of domestic savers. The golden days of the yen carry trade seem so distant with US$1/Y90-level support so sticky. It’s a real shame that Japanese companies don’t pay quarterly dividends as is common practice in the U.S., for instance, since household, quality Japanese companies are in some cases paying dividends at multiples of what JGBs offer. The desperate search for yield could be called off. Instead of chasing the latest overseas investment fad or making risky leveraged forex trades, maybe something more productive could be achieved.

Disclosure: The author has no direct exposure to JGBs, and does not believe a crisis is looming for Japan despite David Einhorn’s position, and in spite of the serious problems the country faces but continues to bundle into a bumbling status-quo. 

More often than not, it is overseas factors that have the largest influence on trading in Japan. However, from time to time there is enough commotion domestically that also warrants the attention of investors. Unfortunately, the cacophony coming out of the government these days is more concerning than usual (e.g. Japan Post management/reform, debt moratorium, JAL, etc). But let’s not forget earnings season is here.

Following is a market summary of last week’s action courtesy of the Tokyo Stock Exchange:

Despite the decline in the American exchanges reflecting weak corporate financial statements, the market continued with slight gains from the previous week backed by the strong tone of the Asian stock market. Further into the week, rising prices of oil and other commodities in the commodities market led to buying centered around resource stocks as the market strenghtened. Heading into the weekend, while there were positives with the yen falling to the 91 yen-per-dollar level, easing concerns over deterioration in corporate export estimates, many uncertainties such as the reconstruction of JAL and the direction on the moratorium remained. In addition, a wait-and-see sentiment grew amongst investors as they chose to wait for the announcement of July-September period financial statements by domestic corporations. As a result, the market struggled to make any headway.

This brief post was inspired by a Bloomberg story on Asian currency strength — a good read, by the way. My thoughts: an even stronger Korean won would bring some relief to Japanese exporters. However, it’s not clear just how much (for instance, consider the volume of autos sold by JP vs SK) with such subdued demand (sans government gimmicks for autos). At this point, the currency story is driven by the depreciating dollar.

Global central bank rates (Brazil 8.75%, South Africa 7.0%, Mexico 4.5%, Australia 3.25%, New Zealand 2.5%, ECB 1.0%, UK 0.5%, USA 0.25%, Canada 0.25%, Switzerland 0.25%, Japan 0.11%) as of October 16, 2009. See chart image below. [Source: Bloomberg; Central Bank web sites]

Below is an extract of the latest data from the U.S. Treasury concerning foreign holders of U.S. Treasuries (year-to-date through the end of August). At least for now, the fear of foreigners dumping Treasuries can be allayed, although it is clear there is some month-month volatility from a key buyer (see the figures for Mainland China). Also, notice how the UK and Hong Kong have significantly stepped up purchases YTD. When I last published an extract of the data in January 2008, Japan was the largest holder at $586.9B, followed by Mainland China at $492.6B, and the UK at $160B.

Click table image to expand size.

For those in the area, below is a list of upcoming talks hosted by Japan Society New York. Click the respective link for additional information and for registration.

Oct. 20   Financial Reporting Reliability & Transparency: Activities of FASB & the ASBJ during the Financial Crisis

Oct. 27   Boeing & Japan: A Strategic Partnership for 21st-Century Aerospace Leadership

Oct. 28   How Foreign Companies are Remaking the American Dream

Nov. 3   Wanted: A New Engine for Global Economic Recovery

The latest and largest equity dilution — approx. $5.6B; 30% s/o — by Nomura (JP: 8604) (NMR: 7.60 +2.01%) has sent its shares down 16% to ¥573 in Tokyo ($6.35 at ¥90.3/$1) following an earlier rout in NY.  I think the stock has further to fall, given that it was saved by its daily loss-limit (‘limit-down’) in Tokyo with volume of only 8.9 million shares. Volume thus far in September has ranged from a low of 17M shares traded to start the month, to a high of 65M last Friday.

At this point, the $5.6B it plans to raise over the next month would have been more than enough to have just acquired Lehman USA last year! Now the company and its shareholders face the challenge and risk of having to use the capital to expand existing U.S. operations and somehow grow some new business. Doing these things (profitably) has never been easy for Nomura, though it’s always been a dream of sorts.

Meantime, the stock is massively diluted, and unattractive at current levels due to the uncertainty of how effectively it will deploy the capital — it’s about 40% above its March low. While I agree with Goldman’s take that the capital raising is offensive, rather than defensive, in nature, I think it’s a little much. The Japanese business press does too, apparently, dubbing Nomura and the broader market’s sell-off the “Nomura shock.”

- No position in any companies mentioned.